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Global climate change is here. According to recent scientific reports, the earth has 
warmed by nearly half a degree centigrade over the last twenty five years. Even with 
robust mitigation efforts, the global climate could warm by up to 4 degrees centigrade 
due to past emissions. Under a business-as-usual, high consumption fossil fuel-based 
development path, it could warm even more, resulting in catastrophic and life-threatening 
destruction of earth’s eco-systems.  
 
The “climate imperative”—the urgent need to both mitigate and adapt to global 
climate change—has important implications for economic development paths in general 
and industry and energy policies in particular. Development models and practice 
historically have treated climate—and indeed, the natural environment in general—as 
exogenous. Future development models will need to incorporate both climactic 
uncertainty and the economic threats and opportunities arising from an evolving global 
climate regime. Developing countries, which are especially vulnerable to climate 
instability, will need to design energy and industry policies which aim to achieve not only 
economic and social objectives but which also enhance climate resilience.  
 
This paper explores the broad contours of climate resilient industrial development 
paths. It defines development as an increase in local capacities for production and 
innovation and argues that the overarching goal of development is the generation of 
sustainable livelihoods. It suggests that. to be climate resilient,  industry policies should 
have four key design features: 1) they are pro-active; 2)  they promote industrial 
diversification; 3) they focus on mobilizing investment in environmentally sustainable 
industries and infrastructure, including low-carbon and renewable energy; 4) they are 
highly responsive to local geo-physical conditions and are based on principles of adaptive 
management; and 5) they are designed, implemented and governed via accountable 
partnerships involving government, business, and community actors.    
 
The paper evaluates three development macro-models—neo-liberal, sustainable 
globalization, and new developmental—against the five design principles and finds that 
aspects of both climate vulnerability and climate-resilience are embodied in each. The 
paper concludes that responding to the climate imperative will require not a new 
synthesized one-size-fits-all model but a multiplicity of economic development paths. 
The effort to articulate the theory and praxis of such paths has barely begun.  
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Climate-Resilient Industrial Development Paths:  








The unfolding drama of global climate change has paradigm-shifting implications 
for development theory and policy. Despite recent findings that the Washington 
Consensus is adrift (Rodrik 2008), development practice remains largely wedded to 
global, market-driven neo-liberal policies based on maximizing GNP growth and high-
energy consumption, by maximizing inflows of foreign investment, integrating with 
global supply chains, and eschewing pro-active industry policies.  
 
The climate change imperative—the urgent need to both mitigate and adapt to 
climate change—has arisen at a time when many medium-income developing nations are 
on the threshold of major investments in industry and energy infrastructure. It is also a 
time of deep global economic inequity, spurring efforts by the global community—such 
as the Millennium Development Goals—to alleviate poverty and promote social 
development, including via new business models.  Finally, the climate change imperative 
has emerged at a historical moment when development theory has been shaken loose by 
the economic, social and environmental shortcomings of neo-liberal orthodoxy. These 
three factors combine to create an opportune moment to consider how industrial 
transformation and economic development could—and indeed, must—evolve along new 
“climate resilient” paths.  
 
This paper considers the broad contours of climate resilient industrial 
development paths and evaluates climate-resilience in three development models. It 
defines development as an increase in local capacities for production and innovation. 
However, it argues that the central objective of development strategies in a climate-
constrained world is not industrialization per se but the generation of sustainable 
livelihoods.  
 
The paper is in five sections. Section two reviews the recent science about global 
climate instability and outlines links between climate change and economic development. 
Section three broadly defines climate resilient development. Section four outlines five 
design features of climate resilient industry polices. Section five evaluates three 
economic development models against the design features: 1) neo-liberal globalization; 
2) sustainable globalization; and 3) new developmental. The final section concludes and 
suggests directions for further research.  
 
                                                             
1 Lyuba Zarsky is Associate Professor at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. She is also a 
Research Fellow at the Global Development and Environment Institute and International Fellow at the 
International Institute for Environment and Development, which provided support for this research.  
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Climate Change Imperative 
 
Global warming is here. According to the Fourth Assessment of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007: 2), “warming of the climate 
system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in average global 
air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average 
sea level.”  
 
Scientific reports since the Fourth Assessment have found that the signs of global 
warming are accelerating faster than predicted, including melting of Arctic sea-ice, 
glaciers, and ice sheets. Sea level rise in 2009 was 80 percent greater than predicted by 
the IPCC just two years before. Over the past 25 years, temperatures have increased at an 
average rate of 0.19 degrees centigrade per decade (UNSW 2009). A September 2009 
conference of climate scientists found that "since the late 1990s, greenhouse gas 
emissions have increased at close to the most extreme IPCC scenarios” and there is a 
significant possibility of 4 degrees warming before the end of the century (Science Daily 
2009).  
 
The scientific consensus, and the assumption of the Kyoto Protocol, is that the 
avoidance of dangerous climate instability requires that warming be kept below 1.5 
degrees centigrade. A higher level of warming portends major regional and local impacts 
on eco-systems, human settlements, food production, and bio-diversity.  New scientific 
evidence that past emissions had a significant probability of generating a warming of  2 
degrees  triggered intense protests at the December, 2009 Copenhagen climate talks by 
African NGOs who chanted “Two degrees is suicide!” (COP 15 (2009). 
.  
The primary anthropogenic contribution to global climate change is the emission 
of carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels and deforestation. As indicated above, 
under a business-as-usual scenario with no mitigation of emissions, the IPCC’s Fourth 
Assessment in 2007 projected an increase of 3.5 degrees centigrade by the end of the 
century (IPCC 2007).  Despite more than a decade of global climate diplomacy, global 
carbon emissions were 40 percent higher in 2008 than in 1990. Even if emissions were 
stabilized at the current rate and brought to zero by 2030,  just twenty more years of 
emissions would result in a 25 percent probability that warming will exceed 2 degrees 
(ibid). In a 2009 review of the science since the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment  (UNSW 
2009), an Australian team of climate scientists concluded: 
 
If global warming is to be limited to a maximum of 2 degrees C above pre-
industrial values, global emissions need to peak between 2015 and 2020 and then decline 
rapidly. To stabilize climate, a de-carbonized global society—with near-zero emissions of 
CO2 and other long-lived greenhouse gases—needs to be reached well within this 
century. …[E]very year of delayed action increases the chances of exceeding 2°C 
warming (UNSW 2009: 7).  
 
Even with mitigation efforts, climate models predict that the planet will continue 
to warm as a result of past carbon emissions, necessitating human adaptation. The 
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impacts of climate change on humans are defined by the interface between bio-physical 
and socio-economic systems. The primary expected changes in bio-physical systems are 
1) increased temperature and changes in rainfall patterns; and 2) sea-level rise and an 
increase in the incidence and severity of disasters (fire, storms). There is also increasing 
evidence of the possibility of ocean acidification with attendant loss of biological 
productivity of marine life.  The bio-physical impacts will vary greatly by region and 
locale.  
 
Bio-physical impacts will have a variety of secondary effects on socio-economic  
systems, including severe stresses on water availability (drought and flooding) and  
damage to existing assets and infrastructure. These stresses in turn, are likely to trigger a 




 Expected impacts of climate change  
 
Bio-physical  impact                       
                                  
Social impact          Economic impact 
Increased temperature and 
changes in rainfall patterns 
Reduced agricultural     
       productivity (drought) 
Reduced marine productivity 
Water stress and scarcity 
Increased prevalence of disease 
Forced migration 
 
Reduced supplies and higher  
     prices for food 
Changes in arability and   
     cropping patterns 
Reduced availability and higher 
     prices for water 
Change in distribution of labor   
     supply 
 
Sea level rise and increased 
incidence or intensity of 
disasters (storms, fires)   
Damage to assets and  
      infrastructure 
 
Population displacement  
 
Conflict  
High cost of insurance 
Disruption of supply inputs 
Disruption of final markets 





Carbon regulation  
Conflict 
Rising fossil fuel prices 
Governance breakdown 
 
Source:  Adapted from Tanner and Mitchell (2008) 
 
    The impacts of climate change will be felt most acutely by people in developing 
countries for two reasons. The first is bio-physical risk. Besides the poles, climate models 
show warming trends to be greatest in sub-Saharan and northern Africa, as well as parts 
of south, central and east Asia (IPCC 2007: Figure SPM2). Second, developing countries, 
especially least-developed countries, lack the capacity to adapt to climate stress. Adaptive 
capacity is a broad-ranging concept that spans basic socio-economic resilience stemming 
from wealth (income, technology, knowledge) to abilities to mitigate specific climate-
related threats, such as climate monitoring and disaster planning.  
 
    Together, bio-physical risk and lack of adaptive capacity comprise the 
vulnerability of individuals, economies, communities or nations to adapt to global climate 
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change. In an effort to provide guidance on climate risk for global investors, the Canadian 
consulting group Maplecroft calculated a composite “climate change vulnerability index” 
based on bio-physical risk and adaptive capacity. Unsurprisingly, but worrisome 








Explanatory note: Maplecroft Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI) rates 166 countries on their 
capacity to mitigate risks to society and the business environment posed by changing patterns in natural 
hazards, such as droughts, flooding, storms and sea level rises and the resulting effects on ecosystems. The 
climate change vulnerability factors are divided into six groups: economy; natural resource security; 
ecosystems; poverty, development and health; population, settlement and infrastructure; and institutions, 
governance and social capital; and comprises of 33 indicators. The CCVI was calculated using a 
Geographical Information System (GIS) model. Each cell represents an area of approximately 25km². For 
more information see www.maplecroft.com 
Source:  Maplecroft (2010) 
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To date, official development assistance and global adaptation finance have 
sought to reduce vulnerability primarily by increasing local capacities to undertake 
discrete climate adaptation efforts, such as climate monitoring and disaster response. It is 
clear, however, that to significantly increase climate resilience, developing countries 
must increase local economic productivity, in both agriculture and industry, generating 
higher incomes, as well as revenues for infrastructure investment, and better health.  
 
Ironically, for many of the poorest people in developing countries, vulnerability to 
climate change is exacerbated by lack of access to reliable and affordable energy. While 
the earth is dangerously warming as a result of the historical emissions of fossil fuel-
driven industrialization in OECD countries, some 2.4 billion people in developing 
countries still use traditional biomass fuels for cooking and heating; around 1.6 billion 
lack access to electricity (UNDP 2005a). Beyond enhancing human welfare, energy is a 
key input for industrial development, at both micro and macro levels.   
 
Large developing countries like China, India, Brazil and South Africa have built dynamic 
industrial sectors driven largely by fossil fuels and, as a result, have emerged as the 
largest current and future absolute source of carbon emissions (though per capita 
emissions remain far below developed countries.) Defining the obligations of developing 
and developed countries for mitigating carbon emissions has become the pivot—and the 
stumbling block—of attempts to craft a global climate regime.   
 
The climate imperative requires developing countries to integrate mitigation and 
adaptation as central features of development strategy, considering not only threats to 
lives and livelihoods but also new opportunities for industrial transformation. A global 
effort to regulate carbon and replace carbon-based energy infrastructure, for example, 
will spur dramatic growth of low carbon and renewable energy technology industries, 
including off-grid technologies. Developing countries may be able to leapfrog fossil fuel-
based growth and create competitive advantages in low and no carbon energy and 
industrial technologies and processes. Given the large stakes, it is little wonder that the 
Human Development Report called  climate change ”the defining human development 
issue of our generation” (UNDP 2007).  
 
 
Defining Climate Resilient Development 
 
The first step in defining climate resilient paths of industrial development is to 
define development itself. Rather than growth or poverty alleviation, this paper defines 
(economic) development as the building of local capacities for economic production and 
innovation. Such endogenous capacities are the foundation for both economic growth and 
poverty alleviation. Numerous studies, including by this author, have found that, in a 
global economy, promoting GNP growth without strengthening underlying local 
productive capacities generates economic enclaves dependent on foreign investment and 
export markets (Gallagher and Zarsky 2007). Also, attempts to alleviate poverty without 
enhancing local productive capacity founder when external assistance is withdrawn 
(Easterly 2002).  
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Local capacities for production and innovation embrace knowledge, skills, 
technology, infrastructure, human solidarity, and governing institutions. Such capacities 
not only create or enable the grasp of current opportunities to enhance productivity and 
social welfare, they also enable adaptation to changing conditions—economic, social or 
climactic. The capacity to adapt is a central feature of climate resilience.  
 
The overarching objective of productive and innovative capacities is to provide 
and sustain livelihoods. In climate resilient development models, sustainability is a 
foundational principle for all economic activity. To be sustainable, livelihoods must be 
derived from productive activities that are: 
 
•  Ecologically sound:  they must maintain the health of terrestrial, marine, air and 
atmospheric eco-systems and bio-diversity, at local and global levels;  
•  Economically viable:  they must enhance local productive capacities and allocate 
them efficiently; 
•  Socially resilient:  they must promote equity and social solidarity. 
 
The ability to sustain livelihoods may be highly compromised under rapidly 
changing and uncertain climactic conditions, as well as a rapidly evolving climate regime 
which drives rapidly changing fuel prices. To maintain livelihoods, development 
strategies must explicitly incorporate knowledge of existing and projected local and 
regional climactic conditions and build in industrial and resource diversification and 
other strategies to enhance resilience.  
 
The overarching goal of climate resilient industrial development should thus be to 
generate local capacities to sustain livelihoods for all people under a range of climatic 
conditions in ways that do not exacerbate global warming. Another way to say this is that 
the goal is to reduce vulnerability stemming from lack of an adequate livelihood. Many 
people in developing countries are already highly vulnerable to seasonal climate change 
and other risks.  
 
The goal of promoting sustainable livelihoods conflates what are today often 
approached as separate objectives—poverty alleviation and industrial transformation. A 
focus on reducing vulnerability could invigorate current development efforts.  As two 
leading climate and development researchers argue: “climate change may actually be an 
opportunity to create pathways out of chronic poverty through targeted efforts to enhance 
vulnerability reduction and adaptation” (Tanner and Mitchell 2008: 6).  
 
Moreover, a focus on sustainable livelihoods removes the focus of development 
away from “growth for growth’s sake,” enabling a redirection away from wasteful high-
energy, water-intensive consumption patterns. Finally, it embraces both wage and non-
wage forms of livelihood and livelihoods derived from both agriculture and 
manufacturing.  
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Development strategies aimed at creating sustainable livelihoods thus have as 
their starting point three integrated objectives: 1) increasing income (and equity) by 
increasing the productivity of economic activities; 2) promoting growth in local 
capacities for production and innovation; and 3) increasing resilience of economic 
activity by incorporating knowledge about climate uncertainty and other environmental 
information.  
 
With this starting point in mind, climate resilient development can be 
conceptualized as a socio-economic trajectory that generates and sustains human 
livelihoods in ways that both mitigate and adapt to global climate change. Central to 
mitigation is the transition to non-carbon energy sources. At the global level, it means 
developing along a path that stabilizes atmospheric concentrations within the range of 
350-450 ppms, a level that is understood to be consistent with warming 1.5-2 degrees C. 
For developing countries, mitigation will primarily consist of ensuring that new 
investment in industry, transport, and infrastructure is based on low-carbon and/or 
renewable energy.  
 
Figure 3 
Adaptation and development: A continuum of investment activities 
. 









factors to reduce 
vulnerability to poverty 
and harm;  increase 
local capacities for 
production and 
innovation; mobilize 
investment for low or 
non-carbon energy; 
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social problem-solving  
 
 
Build robust systems for 
innovation and problem 
solving for both climate 
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Source: Adapted from McGray et al (2007) and Tanner and Mitchell (2008) 
 
Climate resilient industrial development paths must be strongly focused on 
adaptation; that is, on reducing vulnerability to global climate change. A central aspect of 
adaptation is that both the change in global average temperature and local and regional 
impacts of global climate change are highly uncertain (Appendix Figure 9.2). One reason 
is that climate scientists poorly understand how local and global feedback loops interact. 
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In some parts of Africa, for example, it is not clear if rainfall will be greater or less or 
both. Moreover, models predict greater climate variability.  
 
The subject of a burgeoning literature, adaptation requires the mobilization of 
investment in activities along a continuum (Figure 3). On one end are discrete actions 
that respond to particular emerging or expected climate changes; for example building or 
reinforcing sea walls in coastal cities or relocating populations of soon-to-be-submerged 
islands. On the other end are investments that promote adaptive capacity by targeting the 
drivers of vulnerability; like poverty, unsustainable industry, lack of sustainable 
livelihoods, poor health, lack of education, good governance, etc. In other words, 
reducing vulnerability to global climate change entails reinvigorating traditional 
development goals. Also critical to climate resilient development is investment in 
problem-solving and response capacities. There is great uncertainty as to how climate 
change will unfold and with what impacts. As stated above, capacities for social learning, 
deliberation and innovation will be at a premium.   
 
Policy Design Principles 
 
Climate-resilient development paths entail a high level of social planning and 
integration of knowledge, both scientific and traditional. They also require a high level of 
social solidarity, given the potentially catastrophic disruption to existing livelihoods. 
Implied is a central role for public policy, in terms of both content -- policy objectives 
and tools -- and the process of designing and implementing policy.  Gleaned from a 
review of “traditional” development case studies, as well as a burgeoning literature on 
climate and development, this section outlines five principles as starting points for the 
design of climate resilient development policy. 
 
Pro-active industry policy 
 
Over the past two decades, neo-liberal approaches to development have eschewed 
pro-active industry policies aimed at nurturing targeted industry sectors in favor of 
industry-neutral “market-driven” integration into global supply chains.  The performance, 
however, has been mixed at best. Latin American countries that rigorously followed the 
neo-liberal prescription, for example, have fared poorly in terms of growth and 
employment compared to China and other East Asian countries (Gallagher and 
Chudnovsky). 
 
Industrial policy has two objectives in terms of linking climate and development. 
First, it aims to reduce vulnerability by promoting financially sustainable livelihoods. 
Second, as outlined by UNCTAD (2009: xiii), it seeks to “shift production and 
consumption patterns towards the use of those primary commodities, means of 
production, and consumer goods that place a lower burden on the earth’s atmosphere than 
the current GHG [greenhouse gas] intensive ones”. Linking climate change mitigation 
policies with traditional development goals, argues UNCTAD, “requires industrial 
policies that foster the creation of capabilities to produce or participate in the production 
of such goods and their subsequent upgrading” (ibid: xv).  
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Pro-active climate-resilient industry policy need not privilege import protection 
policies as in older ISI models. The goal, rather, is to identify efficient, climate-friendly, 
high employment industries and to nurture them by overcoming local market failures. A 
wide range of policy tools is available, including public support for research and 
development, science and technology policy, finance and credit, support for training and 
education, technology partnerships with multinational corporations, reforms in domestic 
patent law, etc. An Overseas Development Institute review of comprehensive policies for 
low carbon growth already employed by nine developed and developing countries 
concluded that “there is a role for government leadership to identify low carbon growth 
sectors which may provide competitive advantage and employment growth” (Ellis et. al.  




Tata BP Solar:  The role of industry policy 
 
Based in Bangalore, India, Tata BP Solar produces domestic and industrial solar water heating 
systems, solar lanterns, home lighting systems, water pumping systems, integrated PV systems 
for buildings and solar streetlights. In addition to 30% of the domestic Indian market, Tata BP 
Solar also has a 67% share of the Bangladeshi market, 25% in Nepal, 35% in Sri Lanka and over 
90% in Bhutan.
 Company profits rose from 16 million rupees in 1991-2 to 4,690 million rupees 
(106 million USD) in 2004-5. 
Tata BP Solar’s commercial success is attributable to the interaction of global market forces and 
domestic policy. The joint venture partnership is a collaboration between BP and Tata Power 
Company, a member of India’s renowned Tata business family. The government of India 
provided a supportive enabling policy environment. India’s large-scale solar PV programmes are 
driven by government subsidies, with tax incentives and other financial incentives. In many cases, 
it is government agencies who take the lead on developing rural energy initiatives in India, by 
making a policy decision and bringing in an appropriate company (such as Tata BP Solar) with 
the required knowledge and capabilities to serve local markets.  
Not all of Tata BP Solar’s markets are located at the base of the pyramid. However, the company 
has demonstrated an ability to reach some of the poorest and most isolated communities. In the 
Himalayan region of Ladakh, Tata BP Solar worked with the Ladakh Renewable Energy 
Development Agency (LREDA) and the Indian Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources to 
provide solar home systems to 80 remote mountainous villages, as the first phase of an initiative 
aimed at providing electricity to the whole Ladakh region. 
In Punjab, the Tata BP Solar collaborated with the Punjab Energy Development Agency on a 
programme to deliver 225 solar water-pumping systems to farmers for irrigation purposes. Much 
of the success of Tata BP Solar’s business model is the provision of a complete service to their 
customers. This long-term commitment is underpinned by the contractual relations established 
between the company and the local government. In Ladakh, end-users were charged for 
installation and maintenance, thus ensuring their commitment. Training was provided not only in 
technical skills, but also in educating and working with the end-users to ensure proper operation 
and maintenance of the systems. 
Source:  Wilson et al (2008) 
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There is ample evidence that pro-active industry policies can be effective in 
promoting climate-friendly industrial growth. Rock and Angel (2005) show that pro-
active industry policies in East Asia are enabling a “sustainability transition.” China’s 
industry support policies have propelled its emergence as a leader in solar photovoltaic 
and wind technology, as well “clean coal” technologies such as direct coal liquefaction 
(UN-DESA 2009). Brazil’s support for the development and deployment of a domestic 
sugar-based ethanol industry allowed it to capture a vibrant export market in the 
burgeoning global bio-fuels sector (ibid). In India, local government support enabled the 
emergence of a major domestic supplier of solar energy systems for households and 




Providing sustainable livelihoods in developing countries is largely a function of 
creating employment-generating enterprises (or agricultural operations) that are 
interlinked in productive industry sectors. Climate constrained industrial development 
thus has significant overlap with a development emphasis on industrial transformation 
and diversification. Many economists argue that diversification, rather than 
specialization, is the central driver of economic growth (Rodrik 2007).  
 
Many developing countries have based their industrial development strategy on 
one or a handful of export sectors, either primary or manufacturing, integrated into global 
supply chains.  Such a strategy makes livelihoods highly vulnerable to exogenous shifts, 
including rapid changes in exchange rates, emergence of lower cost competitors, global 
market collapse due to over-inflated expectations, etc. In the Mexican city of 
Guadalajara, for example, some 22,000 workers lost their jobs between 2001-03 due to a 
combination of global market contraction in the IT industry and the entry of China into 
the WTO (Dussel 2005).  
 
For two reasons, industrial diversification is likely to become more central to 
sustaining livelihoods as climate change unfolds. First, fossil fuel prices will rise due to 
climate policy and / or scarcity. As a result, long global supply chains will be more 
expensive, especially those based on air and truck freight. Local companies will become 
more competitive in servicing local markets. Moreover, MNCs (multinational 
corporations) will increasingly seek local supply inputs for products aimed at both export 
and domestic markets.  Secondly, climate events may make global supply chains more 
vulnerable to disruption. Insurance costs are likely to rise, further reducing the 
competitiveness of global input sourcing. A corollary to the renewed emphasis on 
industrial diversification is the rising importance of producing for domestic markets 




At the heart of climate resilient industrial development paths is the mobilization, 
leveraging, and strategic targeting of investment. Private and public, domestic and 
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international sources of capital and finance are required to rapidly ratchet up industries 
that promote sustainable livelihoods and transform production and consumption 
structures towards low or no carbon growth. “Countries that identify, target and secure 
new green investment and growth opportunities,” concludes the Overseas Development 
Institute, “stand to benefit more from the transition to a low carbon economy” (Ellis et. 
al. 2009: ix).  
 
Where will investment funds come from? At the international level, efforts to 
mobilize climate-related finance have focused on official development assistance, such as 
the Global Adaptation Fund, and emissions trading and offset schemes such as the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and the burgeoning Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) fund. To date, however, adaptation 
financing has been very meager, while CDM projects are concentrated in China and 
India, largely in hydro-electric dams and reducing emissions in dirty industries, such as 
cement and chemicals (International Rivers 2008).  Indeed, the CDM has been widely 
criticized for its failure to promote sustainable development (Schneider 2007).  
Nonetheless, within the context of a strategic pro-active approach for industrial 
development, developing countries might find opportunities to gain or leverage 
investment through international climate-related funding mechanisms. 
 
A much greater source of investment is private capital, including domestic 
savings and foreign direct investment (FDI). Policies that improve the overall functioning 
of domestic financial markets and the quality of FDI are key to climate resilient industry 
growth. In parallel with a pro-active approach to industry policy is a pro-active approach 
to investment, in both form and function. In terms of form, governments need to look 
towards new types of collaborations with investors, including via public-private 
partnerships and social entrepreneurship.  
 
A pro-active approach to investment entails the creation and incorporation of 
decision-making frameworks to allocate investment in both industry and infrastructure in 
ways that optimize dual goals of increasing economic productivity while reducing 
climate risk, both local and global. Without such a framework, investment could be 
maladaptive. For example, massive investment in palm oil plantations in Indonesia to 
service global demand for bio-fuels exacerbates global climate risk because it increases 
net carbon emissions due to native forest clearing; and  increases local climate risk 
because it undermines forest livelihoods and bio-diversity resources (Block 2009). 
 
New decision-making frameworks are emerging that seek to evaluate returns on 
alternative investment options according to integrated indicators of economic 
productivity and climate risk (ECA 2009). Obviously, these frameworks entail first an 
assessment of climate risk based on scientific and local knowledge. Given the high level 
of uncertainty, assessments are based on a range of scenarios linking local and regional 
climate-weather interactions to potential economic losses to existing productive assets, as 
well as potential economic gains from adaptation investment.  
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The Economics of Climate Adaptation Working Group applied such a framework 
to project the economic costs of climate risk and identify a portfolio of investment 
options to reduce risk in test cases in eight different regions of the world, including North 
and North East China (drought risk to agriculture); the Mopti region in Mali (risk to 
agriculture from climate zone shift); and Georgetown, Guyana (risk from flash floods). 
The study’s findings are sobering i.e. that a “significant economic value is at risk” from 
climate change. Encouragingly, however, the test cases revealed that “rational measures 
to improve climate resilience are in many cases also effective steps to strengthen 
economic development” (ibid: 56). In Mali, for example, “the implementation of climate-
resilient agricultural development could potentially bring in billions of dollars a year in 
additional revenue” (ibid: 12).  
 
Knowledge-intensive local adaptive management 
 
Climate resilient development policies, including industry policies, will have to be 
regularly re-evaluated and re-designed to adapt to anticipated and unanticipated local 
climactic conditions, as well as to new climate knowledge. Indeed, knowledge about 
local and regional bio-physical conditions and their socio-economic impacts will need to 
be foundational in shaping industrial development.  
 
A new field of policy research is exploring principles for adaptive management 
and, led by the International Institute of Sustainable Development and The Energy 
Research Institute, applying them to climate change adaptation (Figure 5). Adaptive 
management is based on creating avenues for new information and changing conditions 
to be incorporated in policy redesign and implementation. It allows institutions to 
continually gain knowledge, make assessments, monitor, and change course or procedure.   
 
Figure 5 
Adaptive policy: A Conceptual Framework 
 
Source:  IISD and TERI (2006) 
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Adaptation to anticipated conditions is based on developing a comprehensive 
understanding of cause and effects (as much as possible); adaptation to unanticipated 
conditions requires a comprehensive understanding of overall system dynamics and 
complexity—in this case, the global climate system and its socio-economic interactions.   
 
Four types of policies can be identified as adaptive: 
•  No regrets:  policies that achieve desired objectives under a range of 
circumstances. In the climate change world, these policies have often been 
considered to be cost-effective investments in climate change mitigation.  
•  Triggers:  policies that adjust automatically to changing circumstances. An 
example might be water pricing policies that change according to water supply 
(e.g. drought). 
•  Complex system:  policies that derive from complexity theory, and which point 
towards effective intervention in multi-dimensional systems. An understanding of 
such policies will require investment in education and R and D.  




Climate-resilient industry policy has a challenging agenda, demanding a high 
degree of knowledge, flexibility and social solidarity. While government must provide 
leadership, the primary form of governance and collective action should be partnerships 
between government, the private sector and civil society. All sectors are needed both to 
provide information and to undertake action, including the design and implementation of 
effective policy.  
 
Tri-sector collaboration can take a variety of forms and have a variety of 
functions. At the macro level, an overarching “industry council” could be tasked with 
developing a comprehensive approach to investment and industry policy. One policy 
might be to promote micro-level “social business” partnerships that integrate 
environmental/climate and financial returns via credit, tax relief, business training, etc.  
 
 
Climate Resilience in Three Development Models  
 
The previous section sketched overarching objectives and policy design principles 
as foundational criteria for climate resilient industrial development paths. This section 
considers climate resilience in three development models: 1) neo-liberal globalization; 2) 




The over-arching objective of the neo-liberal globalization development model is 
to increase the rate of economic growth measured as GNP (or GDP) per capita by 
market-based integration into the global economy. The primary policy prescriptions are 
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to maximize inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and integrate into global supply 
chains in which final products are generally exported to OECD countries.  Economic 
growth promotes livelihoods directly by generating employment and indirectly by 
generating fiscal revenues for public goods such as education and health (Easterly 2002). 
 
The fundamental design principle for industrial development in the neo-liberal 
model is to promote market forces. Pro-active industry policies are actively eschewed.  
The primary policy tools are liberalization, privatization and deregulation, as well as 
investment incentives aimed broadly at increasing the quantity of FDI inflows. Though 
apparently “neutral,” neo-liberal industry policies tend to favor foreign investors and 
multinational corporations over local producers. They also give foreign investors 
maximum freedom over all aspects of business management (Rodrik 2007). Benefits to 
local productive capacities are assumed to come from knowledge and technology 
spillovers by MNCs, who also diffuse “best practice” environmental management 
standards to local producers (OECD, 2002).
2 
 
Rather than industrial diversification, the pursuit of comparative advantage is the 
primary route to economic and industrial growth in the neo-liberal globalization model. 
Developing countries are urged, for example, to specialize in low-wage manufacturing 
industries, monoculture primary commodities, and/or extractive industries. Investment 
plays a central role and the emphasis is on mobilizing private foreign capital. Indeed, the 
model could be renamed “FDI-led growth”.   
 
Finally, the neo-liberal globalization model treats the natural environment as 
exogenous to economic modeling and external to core industrial development goals. 
Generally, the environmental impacts of industry are conceived as externalities that can 
be ignored until incomes are higher. Rather than incorporating scientific knowledge and 
utilizing adaptive management to integrate and balance the twin objectives of economic 
growth and bio-physical resilience, the neo-liberal model emphasizes a singular policy 
tool-kit that aims to maximize efficiency and yield of commercial output.  
  
The neo-liberal globalization model poses severe shortcomings for climate 
resilient development in terms of both mitigation and adaptation. First, a focus on GNP 
growth makes livelihoods secondary; an indirect outcome rather than the central 
objective of development. Moreover, the model virtually ignores bio-physical 
sustainability, creating a high level of livelihood vulnerability. Many studies have 
documented the reality of “jobless growth” and growth in commercial value at the 
expense of long-term resource productivity. Brooks et. al. (2009) provide a “dramatic 
example” from the Sahel: 
 
[D]evelopment policies in the 1950s and 1960s sought to achieve a shift from subsistence 
to commercial agriculture...to ensure that countries which were soon to be independent 
were capable of maintaining stable, functional national economies that were integrated 
into the world economy. The result was the intensification of agriculture, agricultural 
expansion into areas viewed as underutilized, the undermining of traditional risk-
management measures and the marginalization of pastoralists. This all occurred during an 
usually wet period. When rainfall declined in the late 1960s, culminating in severe 
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drought in the early 1970s, agriculture and pastoralism collapsed, resulting in a famine 
that killed hundreds of thousands of people and millions of animals, precipitating severe 
social disruption. Brooks et. al. (2009: 745) 
 
The second shortcoming of the neo-liberal model lies in its “neutral” industry 
policies. A host of studies have shown that, in the absence of pro-active industry policy, 
FDI-led growth tends to promote industrial enclaves, rather than broad-based growth. 
The primary reason is that hoped-for knowledge, technology and human capital spillovers 
from MNCs have not materialized (Cordero and Paus 2008; Gallagher and Zarsky 2007; 
Hanson 2001; Jenkins 2006). Rather than seek local suppliers, MNCs source inputs 
globally, reducing potential contributions to sustainable livelihoods directly through 
employment and indirectly by inhibiting the growth of local enterprises with increased 
capacities for production and innovation. Besides creating livelihoods, such capacities are 
needed to promote a low-carbon transition rapid enough to stave off catastrophic climate 
change while simultaneously promoting sustainable livelihoods.  
 
A third shortcoming is the neo-liberal model’s emphasis on FDI as the primary 
source of investment in domestic industry. In addition to increasing vulnerability to 
exogenous disruption, FDI-led growth can retard the domestic financial reforms needed 
to mobilize domestic savings. Even in the poorest countries, pools of domestic savings 
are much bigger than foreign funds. In addition, tax “holidays” and other incentives 
minimize the contribution of MNCs to public funds. Both domestic savings and public 
funds are needed to mobilize the massive amounts of investment required for both 
climate mitigation and adaptation.  
 
Another weakness of FDI-led growth is that it generates a competitive global 
bargaining context in which developing (and developed) countries are reluctant to raise 
and  enforce local environmental standards or demand environmental conditionalities of 
MNCs, a phenomenon which I have elsewhere described as “stuck in the mud” (Zarsky 
2004). The problem can be overcome only by global environmental standards that seek to 
internalize environmental externalities, such as carbon emissions. However, proponents 
of neo-liberal development -- including many developing country governments -- argue 
that global environmental standards, such as might be imposed in a global climate treaty 
aimed at reducing carbon emissions, obstruct development (i.e. growth) goals.  
 
Citing the principles of state sovereignty and the right to development, as well as 
the purported environmental benefits of higher income as expounded in the 
“environmental Kuznets curve,” they argue that developing countries should be free to 
set their own environmental standards. Combined with the reality that current 
atmospheric carbon concentrations are the historical responsibility of developed nations, 
this logic resulted in the distinction in the Kyoto Protocol between Annex I (developed) 
countries with obligations to reduce carbon emissions and Annex II (developing) 
countries with no specific mitigation obligations.  
 
A final shortcoming of the neo-liberal model for climate resilience is that it puts 
MNCs singularly at the heart of industrial investment decisions that are likely to greatly 
affect the ability of local enterprises and communities to adapt to climate change. The 
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actual impacts of global climate change are highly uncertain and will unfold at local and 
regional levels. Collaborative governance is needed to determine climate-response 
actions, including potential trade-offs between reducing climate risk and increasing or 
maintaining economic growth.  
 
The strength of the neo-liberal model lies in the potential role that foreign finance 
and FDI could play in promoting climate resilient industrial development. MNCs have 
significant financial, technological and management knowhow that could, given the right 
policy framework, be harnessed to promote bio-physically and socio-economically 
sustainable livelihoods. Mobilizing global capital markets for industry and infrastructure 
projects that reduce climate risk while promoting economic growth would help to fill the 
large need for adaptation financing.  
 
Sustainable globalization  
 
Building on the “corporate social responsibility” movement, progressive business 
leaders and Robert Zoellick, head of the World Bank, have recently called for a model of 
“inclusive and sustainable globalization” (WBCSD 2007;  Zoellick 2008). This model 
shares many features of the neo-liberal model.  The overarching objective remains 
increasing GNP growth by promoting FDI inflows through liberalization, deregulation 
and privatization policies, albeit with a more nuanced emphasis on integrating local 
producers into global supply chains (Moran 2006).  
 
The sustainable globalization model has two distinctive features, both of which 
potentially contribute to climate resilience. The first is the call for environmental 
standards and objectives, including mitigation of carbon emissions, to be integrated into 
industry and business management. Two policy tools are recommended. First, global 
business firms are encouraged to voluntarily adopt “best practice” in all their production, 
distribution and marketing activities, wherever they are based. Second, the model 
explicitly recognizes the need for a global climate framework in which all states, 
developed and developing, shoulder obligations to reduce carbon emissions.   
 
The second distinctive feature is the emphasis on the role of private-public 
partnerships (PPPs) to promote specific sustainable development objectives. Heavily 
promoted at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 
Johannesburg, PPPs are emerging as a vehicle whereby global companies collaborate in 
specific capacity-building and infrastructure projects with local governments, 
international institutions, development groups, and other “development actors.” The 
overwhelming number of WSSD Partnerships target water and sustainable energy 
projects (Biermann et. al. 2007). 
 
In addition to helping deliver public goods, MNCs are also working in 
partnerships with governments and/or NGOs to promote enterprises for sustainable 
development, targeting especially the poorest income groups in developing countries 
(UNDP 2005b). The contribution of MNCs is either philanthropic, more recently called 
“social investment,” or via core business activities through “social business”  (Yunus 
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2007). Aimed at creating enterprises that are financially sustainable while serving the 
poor, such an approach can potentially achieve more in terms of climate resilient 
development than purely aid-driven initiatives. Off-grid sustainable energy and water 
enterprises, for example, are a fast growing sectors of MNC partnerships in social 
business (Figure 6). To date, however, social business has remained marginal to total 
MNC core business activity and to national development strategies.  
 
Figure 6 
Energiebeau:  Partnering for off-grid energy 
 
Energiebau is a mid-size German company providing and wholesaling solar 
electrification systems. In addition to serving customers in Germany and Europe, it 
delivers off-grid solar systems to remote communities, mostly in Africa. Energiebau 
partnered with the German capacity building development organisation InWEnt in a 1.1 
million Euro public-private partnership to provide off-grid energy to rural communities. 
Local religious and community groups helped design and implement the project. The 
concept involves a village-level solar powered system supplemented by a generator in 
times of peak usage and bad weather. The generator is powered by locally cultivated 
jatropha oil, which provides income for local cultivators as well as energy fuel 
independence. 
Source:  Wilson et al (2008) 
 
    Despite its strengths, the sustainable globalization model has major weaknesses in 
terms of promoting climate resilient development. The primary weakness is that, despite 
innovations at the margin, it is based on the assumption that the combination of global 
environmental regulation, business goodwill, and global market forces can deliver 
sustainable development. Like the neo-liberal model, it promotes “neutral” industry 
policies that inhibit more muscular environmental commitments to channel paths of 
industry evolution (needed to mitigate climate change) and that have had limited results 
in nurturing local broad-based sustainable growth (needed to reduce vulnerability). 
Successful project-based PPPs that enhance local productive capacities provide pointers 
toward a new developmental model but remain sidelined until they are scaled up and 




    A new developmental model has a different starting point than either neo-liberal 
or sustainable globalization models. While it aims to achieve GNP growth, the 
overarching objective is to promote endogenous productive and technological capacity, 
incorporated in the concepts of industrial transformation and diversification (Rodrik 
2007). Moreover, unlike the neo-liberal and sustainable globalization models, which are 
rooted in a belief in the power of global market forces, new developmental models 
emphasize the centrality of local socio-economic and institutional landscapes in driving 
development outcomes. Countries which have adopted new developmental models, such 
as China, Singapore, and Brazil, generally have a better track record in terms of both 
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GNP and job growth than those like Mexico and the Philippines which have adopted a 
neo-liberal model (Amsden 2003; Evans 1995; Agosin and Meyer 2000).  
 
    Industry policy in new developmental models is based on the idea that 
governments must be pro-active to capture the benefits of global market forces, including 
spillovers from FDI, for industrial upgrading, transformation, and diversification. It is not 
the specific tools of industry policy—which span from performance requirements and 
credit subsidies to support for targeted research and development and investment in 
education and training—which make up the essence of new developmentalism. Rather, it 
is the commitment to determine what blend of industry-promotion policies are likely to 
work in a specific national context.  
 
    New developmentalism shares some features with “old” developmentalism based 
on import protection and export promotion. Both pro-actively use industry policy tools to 
nurture growth of targeted industries. However, the new developmental “broad-gauged” 
approach focuses more on overcoming market failures—including information and 
coordination--which inhibit industrial development (Stiglitz 2005). It also aims to work in 
partnership with MNCs to promote “quality” FDI; that is, investment in strategic 
industries and technologies. Finally, it looks to both domestic and export markets for 
possible industrial growth.   
 
    A new developmental framework offers several advantages over globalization-
based models for climate resilient development. A strong and strategic role for 
government leadership in promoting industry could channel FDI, R&D, and public 
investment towards low-carbon and zero-carbon energy and industry growth. Moreover, 
the “embedded autonomy” framework of collaboration between government and the 
private sector provides partnership-based flexibility in adapting to changing climatic, as 
well as market, conditions (Evans 1995).  
 
    At the center of the new developmental model is the mobilization of domestic 
savings rather than foreign capital to promote industrial transformation (Bresser-Pereira, 
2009). Nonetheless, foreign investment can play a strategic role in new developmental 
models, including by explicitly targeting low-carbon and other sustainable industries and 
technologies. For example, in December, 2007, China announced a “dramatic revision” 
of its foreign investment strategy, the “keystone” of which is an “emphasis on quality 
over quantity.” The second of five new policies is: 
 
...encouragement of investment in sustainable resources and environmental protection. 
Foreign investors are encouraged to support the newly implemented Circular Economy 
(i.e. sustainable development) and Cleaner Production policies, as well as invest in the 
area of environmental protection, sustainable resources and anti-pollution. The 2007 
catalog greatly expands the list of encouraged investments in this area. On the other 
hand, foreign investment in high resource-use, high energy-use and high-pollution 
enterprises is restricted or prohibited.  
       (Quoted in Dickinson 2007)  
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Despite its strengths, new development theory has three shortcomings in promoting 
climate resilience. The first is blindness to the natural environment. New developmental 
theorists generally have not integrated bio-physical constraints into development strategy 
and have ignored the potential interaction of industry and environmental, including 
climate policy. A large literature on “sustainable development” remains un-integrated 
into much new developmental thinking.  
 
    One exception is the work of “sustainability transition” researchers studying the 
interaction of global market forces and local institutions in promoting socio-technological 
innovations which point towards a more sustainable industrialization. In a study of 
cement and electronics industries, Rock et. al. (2009:  241) found that the “capitalist 
developmental states in East and Southeast Asia have been better able [than countries 
with neo-liberal policies] to harness global economic forces for technological and 
sustainability transitions through an openness to trade and investment and effective 
public–private institutions able to link cleaner technologies and environmental standards 
to production activities in firms.”   
 
    The second shortcoming of the new developmental framework is that it does not 
explicitly target pro-poor growth, although it does focus on promoting employment. In all 
societies, poorer people, both urban and rural, are more vulnerable to risk in general and 
will be more vulnerable to climate risk. Moreover, the model is gender-blind, not 
differentiating between men and women in terms of capacities and constraints. Recent 
studies have shown that women are differentially and particularly vulnerable to climate 
change impacts, including food shortages due to drought or flooding and higher incidence 
of disease (Aguilar et. al. 2007). Women are also key agents of enterprise and resource 
management.  To promote broad-based climate resilience, new development models will 
need to conceive of the poor as agents of enterprise and specifically adopt gender 
inclusive, pro-poor industry development policies.  
    
   The third shortcoming of the new developmental model for climate resilience is 
that its focus on social collaboration typically encompasses only (national) government 
and the private sector. A wider range of actors will be needed to chart a climate resilient 
trajectory of industrial development trajectory, including municipal governments, labor 
and community groups, international development organizations, and others. A summary 
of the conceptualization of climate resilience in the three development models is 
presented in Figure 7.GDAE Working Paper No. 10-01: Climate-Resilient Industrial Development Paths 
Figure 7 
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Conclusion: From Models to Paths?  
 
This paper has presented a theoretical framework to conceptualize the purpose 
and the practice of development given the imperative to mitigate and adapt to global 
change. It defined the objective of climate resilient development as the generation of 
local, broad-based productive capacities that can provide livelihoods that are 
environmentally and economically sustainable and that promote social solidarity. It 
outlined five principles for the design of industry policies that could nurture climate-
resilient sustainable livelihoods and evaluated climate resilience in three current 
development models. 
 
The paper has two central findings. First, aspects of climate resilience are 
embodied in each of the three models. The neo-liberal globalization model emphasizes 
the importance of mobilizing global capital for development, especially FDI. The 
sustainable globalization model highlights the importance of global carbon regulation, the 
potential role of business in reducing poverty, and the benefits of multi-stakeholder, tri-
sector partnerships in designing and implementing industrial development projects and 
governance (Figure 7).  
 
The second finding is that two elements of the new developmentalist model—the 
overarching objective to build endogenous productive capacity and its embrace of a 
strong role for government in industrial development—make it the most robust of the 
three models as a starting point for the design of climate resilient development paths. 
Without these two elements, it is highly unlikely that developing economies will develop 
on a low-carbon trajectory or that they will significantly reduce their vulnerability to 
intensifying climate instability.  
 
A strong role for government in industrial development will require institutional 
reform and capacity-building, at both national and global levels. World trade rules have 
been built to facilitate the neo-liberal globalization model. WTO reform is urgently 
needed to define “policy space” for climate resilient industrial development, not least to 
avoid global trade wars. Nationally, governments need to invest in building the state 
managerial capacities of pro-active industry policies, especially in countries that have 
adopted the neo-liberal globalization model.  
 
These two elements, however, are merely starting points. None of the models puts 
climate risk into the center of development planning. Global climate instability will have 
highly differential impacts, both spatially and temporally. Industrial development policies 
will need to be flexible and adaptive to local natural and institutional conditions. Climate-
resilient development, in short, points not towards a singular “model” but a plurality of 
development paths. The work of understanding the theory and praxis of such paths has 
only just begun.
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1 Reprinted with permission from Maplecroft. 
2  A large literature has found little evidence that FDI generates “horizontal” knowledge 
spillovers, that is, to firms in the same industry,  and mixed evidence that it generates 
“vertical”, that is local supply chain, spill-overs ( for a review, see Gallagher and Zarsky 
2007:Paper 1). Pointing towards a more nuanced approach,  a number of studies  have 
found that local “absorptive capacities” are needed to capture FDI spillovers, including 
well-developed financial markets (Alfaro et. al. 2003),  and  technological capabilities in 
local supplier firms (Chudnovsky and Lopez 2010).  
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